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Abstract
Since the early days of independence, the African continent has been the theatre of many
ethnic conflicts. While people, in general, assume these conflicts to be political and blame the
conflicts on authoritarian regimes, they dismissed the fact that conflict between ethnicities is a
phenomenon that has occurred for hundreds of years and in all corners of the Earth. Entire
countries have been devastated by years of ethnic strife. Once ethnic conflict breaks out, it is
difficult to stop. Conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, and Darfur are among the
deadliest examples from the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The destabilization of states, and in
some cases even regions are consequences of ethnic conflict. These conflicts are also
accompanied by human rights violations including genocide, rape, crime against humanity, state
failure, and economic decline which in turn exacerbate the violence; violent ethnic conflict
always leads to human suffering. Systematic discrimination and exclusion from national and
local political decision making, the appropriation of ethnic minorities’ traditional homelands, and
policies that marginalize ethnic minorities are common practices accompanying ethnic conflict.
Even if fought at a low level of intensity, protracted ethnic conflicts have a great
impact on the affected society. The lack of functional or legitimate political institutions, weak
economic performance, a nonexistent or polarized structure of civil society, and antagonized
elites lead to polarization and separation, leaving societies deeply divided and prone to further
ethnic strife. In addition, ethnic conflicts have very direct effects far beyond what we can
imagine. Those involve refugee flows, internal displacement, regional instability, economic
failures, environmental disasters, diffusion, and spillover effects are conditions favorable
to organized crime and terrorism. In the case of Africa, millions have become displaced persons
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in their own countries or refugees in other. Therefore, it is fair to say that ethnic conflict
represents a threat to international peace and security.
Keywords. Ethnic conflict, discrimination, Africa, peace, security
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Introduction
Led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire acquired independence in 1960 at the same
time as many other African countries. This young country experienced massive economic growth
between 1960 and 1980, the development of the Ivorian economy was spectacular in all fields,
notably agriculture, industry, commerce, and finance. This economic growth was the result of a
policy that played a prominent role within the state, private investment, and foreign capital. The
massive economic growth positively impacted Ivorian society and increased the standard of
living of the inhabitants, the sanitary, educational, and social well-being, which in turn
contributed to population increase. However, since the death of the “father of independence”, a
crisis of succession has engulfed the country causing a coup d’état in 1999, a rebellion that lasted
9 years, and a post-election conflict in 2010-2011 which claimed the lives of thousands of
people. This raises the question: after being politically and economically stable for more than 30
years, why did Côte d’Ivoire suddenly fall into civil war?
Scholars have argued that ethnic conflicts, like the one experienced by Côte d’Ivoire, are most
likely related to resource allocation, and/or land disputes among different cultures and ethnic
groups. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, I will argue that these arguments partially hold but are not
enough to explain ethnic conflicts in the country. Instead, I will show how ideas, specifically the
idea of Ivoirité, shaped the patterns of conflict. Ivoirité initially referred to the common cultural
identity of all those living in Côte d'Ivoire, including foreigners living in the country. However,
the concept of Ivoirité was later utilized to disfranchise Ivorians of foreign descent from
participating in the electoral process or to run for office. This concept was later drafted in the
constitution for the same political purposes.
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My arguments go as follow: the legacy of colonialism and state formation was the first
step in sowing the seeds for ethnic conflict in post-colonial Africa. Although not all states
engaged in ethnic conflict, the countries of Africa were transformed into the most ethnically
fragmented states in the world. Because of these arbitrary borders, people from different ethnic
groups have found themselves separated from their families and ethnic origins. After borders
were drawn, families were separated, and the colonizers imposed their style of rule which gave
the upper hand to some ethnic groups to the detriment of others. From this practice came the
inequalities of resource allocation, the politicization of events, and the application of the concept
of Ivoirité resulting in major ethnic conflicts. This thesis will show Côte d'Ivoire’s initial
establishment during colonization made it prone to ethnic conflict.
Given the relative stability of these ethnic divisions for most of Côte d’Ivoire’s history,
why did resource and power-sharing become such a problem among the people of the country in
the early 2000s? Why did Ivoirité become a concept of exclusion, rather than inclusion, during
this era? This can be answered by looking at how those ethnic groups are geographically located
in the country. Most of the country's resources are in the south and that is also where the political
power is. By "invitation" from President Houphouët-Boigny, the people of the north migrated to
the south to work in plantations; they were soon joined by migrants from other countries. This
arrival spurred tension in the south as the country was already undergoing an economic crisis,
which forced President Houphouët-Boigny to introduce a quota system that would guarantee his
people more seats in government and government offices. The army was even reconstructed to
reduce the number of "foreigners" to include more people of his clan. All these techniques
remained until the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, which led to a crisis of succession that
created new political tensions between groups from different regions of the country.
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Literature review
How have scholars explained the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire? Ieuan Griffiths argues in his
article, “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries,” that one major cause of
conflict (not only ethnic conflict) in Africa is the inherited political boundaries left by European
colonizers. According to the author, modern “African states are territorially identical to the
European colonies they replaced, for all their grotesque shapes and varied size.” In brief, he
argues that Europeans have lumped peoples from different cultures and traditions together in a
single country, leading to problems of secessionist movements and ethnic strife.1 This argument
is convincing as it explained part of the ethnic strife in Côte d’Ivoire and the birth of “Ivoirité”.
In this case, people who have migrated from Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, etc., and have
acquired Ivorian nationalities by legal means were still seen and considered as foreigners by
others. Even some Ivorian-born citizens were considered foreigners because of their parents or
their names.
Similar to Griffiths, Robert Blanton et al., in “Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic
Conflict in Africa," argues that European boundaries were the first step in sowing the seeds for
ethnic conflict in post-colonial Africa. Although not all states engaged in ethnic conflict, the
countries of Africa were “transformed into the most ethnically fragmented states in the world.”2
The authors continue to argue that most scholars emphasize economic, political, and social
deprivation or discrimination as the causes of ethnic conflict in Africa. However, in contrast to
Griffiths, the authors argue that artificial borders and ethnic diversity alone do not explain ethnic

Griffiths, Ieuan. “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries.” The Geographical Journal,
vol. 152, no. 2, 1986, pp. 204–216. p.204.
2
Blanton, Robert, et al. “Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa.” Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 38, no. 4, 2001, pp. 473–491. p. 473
1
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violence. The authors defined these types of conflicts as grievance-based conflicts and argue that
“despite their intuitive appeal, grievance models generate little explanatory power with respect to
ethnic conflict.” By contrast, they argue that structural variables such as ranked (French colonial
style) and unranked systems (British colonial style) of ethnic stratification give better
explanatory powers to ethnic conflicts in Africa.3 The structural difference, the authors argue,
has a significant impact upon the frequency and severity of ethnic conflict after the fall of
colonialism. According to the authors’ view, the French colonial administration was centralized
and mostly based on assimilation with France. The territories were administered by a delegate
from France, while the British colonial system was much more decentralized and based upon
cooperation with locals. The authors then argue that the extent of French assimilation was linked
to ethnicity; "opportunities for upward mobility, education, and power severely limited outside
the dominant group". This created a power structure allowing only the elites from one ethnic
group to seize power once the country became independent and to use this power to create more
uneven assimilation limiting the ability of minority groups to mobilize for collective action. The
French style of colonialism based on assimilation and a central bureaucracy based in France
undermined the traditional social institutions and as a result, ethnic groups outside the dominant
one, lacked the ability to “develop either the political leaders or the organizational capacity to
mobilize their members for collective actions”. On the other hand, Britain did little to change the
traditional patterns of social organization, British policies according to the authors reinforced the
“unranked system of ethnic stratification” causing the colonies to be more prone to ethnic
conflicts. Since no dominant group was formed under British rule, minority groups could
assemble and organize for collective action. After independence, each group in former British

3
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colonies tried to access power as they were afraid of being subjected to another group's
hegemony. This competition, according to the authors, is the reason for the frequency of ethnic
conflicts in former British colonies.
Building on these fragmented states, the divide already presents among the inhabitants of a
nation and especially among ethnic groups in cities can turn violent. This is the tale that author
Saint-Tra Bi, a prominent Ivorian journalist who covered the massacres in Duékoué explains in
his book “Duékoué, La Vérité Interdite”. According to the author, the primary cause of conflict
in this part of the country is due to land disputes. This argument gives us another perspective to
investigate. Saint-Tra Bi argues that well before the 2002 rebellion, the city of Duékoué was a
theater of violence because of a land dispute in which he was a victim and by giving the example
of a violent land dispute between the indigenous Guérés and the Baoulés.4 However, the 2002
rebellion and the 2010-2011 post-electoral conflict exacerbated the violence to an intercommunity conflict dividing the city of Duékoué into two main districts: quartier Kokoman and
the quartier carrefour. In this case, the conflict opposed many ethnic groups from Mali, Burkina,
Niger, and Malinke on one side against the We, Kranh, Yacouba and Guérés on the other side.5
With the post-electoral conflict, the simple land dispute turned into a political drama that brought
militias into the conflicts. Saint-Tra Bi argues that Duékoué is just one example of what
happened in the whole region during the period 2002-2011, the violence was similar in Guiglo,
Man, and Bangolo. Also, since mercenaries were introduced to the Duékoueen conflict, it was
easy to say and understand that the Liberian conflict also entered the region.6 Saint-Tra Bi’s

Bi, Saint-Tra. ”Duékoué : La Vérité Interdite”. Vol. 1. Abidjan : Nouvelles Éditions Balafons, 2019.
Print. p. 138
5
Ibid. p. 37
6
Ibid. p. 37
4
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argument is in contrast with the previous arguments in the sense that Tra Bi argues that the
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in the example of that of Duekoue is based on land rights and land
ownership. This makes us understand a bit more about the overall conflict in Côte D’Ivoire: that
of multiple causes such as grievance model conflict, colonial-style governance, and conflict over
land rights combining to produce conflict.
Where authors like Saint-Tra Bi focus on the relationship between grievances and land
conflict, in the book “Property and Political Order in Africa. Land Rights and the Structure of
Politics”, Catherine Boone proposes a theoretical model allowing the comparative analysis of
land conflicts in Africa. Her reasoning places rural land tenure systems at the center of political
orders in African states, breaking with an analysis that drowns land issues in the study of the
dynamics of “patronage”, “ethnic mobilization”, “civil society” or warfare. She points out that,
across Africa, states have shaped systems of ownership and land distribution that have become
central to power relations and made countries governable. This definition of political relations
through rights of access to land has varied over time and space and explains the various forms of
political conflict within African states. Taking land issues into account in any study of politics on
the continent, therefore, allows us to refine our understanding of conflicts.
In the first part7, Boone presents a remarkably complete model of analysis, before
showing its relevance during the following chapters, by a succession of case studies. Thirty-two
cases whose selection transcends the usual geographic divisions have been examined by the
author, but only a dozen (in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe) are in-depth and detailed. The

7

Catherine Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa. Land Rights and the Structure of
Politics, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 12-89.
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book tests the proposed model through three major questions of Africanist political science:
ethnicity, the scale of conflicts, and electoral episodes. The author, therefore, begins by
identifying two ideal types of land rights allocation systems: the neo-customary land tenure
system, where the distribution of access rights to land is in the hands of local chiefdoms, and the
state regime, where it is the central state which directly assigns land rights to peasants. These two
regimes coexist in most African states, although the neo-customary system is the most
widespread. She insists on the tensions that these regimes are experiencing, mainly because of
the strong land pressure observed everywhere on the continent8. In this regard, the author
emphasizes that the mere increase in population densities in rural areas cannot explain the
different forms taken by land conflicts: the type of land tenure, on the other hand, allows it. By
crossing the "land tenure" and "immigration" variables on local case studies, she then
distinguishes several possible scenarios as to the form of political conflict. Thus, in areas of high
immigration, a neo-customary land tenure system leads to structuring of conflicts on a
"winners/losers" axis in terms of rights of access to land, immigrants, considered as non-native,
having the most chances to be the "losers". The ethnicization of the conflict then takes place on
an "indigenous/foreign" basis, the former being protected by the local chiefdom. In this case, the
conflict will have a good chance of being expressed more at the local level than at the national
level examples of Ghana and Burkina Faso9 and the central state will tend to support local land
elites, often integrated into clientelist networks, to ensure the resolution of the conflict. In a case
where the local chiefdoms determine access to land in an area of low immigration, land conflicts
are most likely to be expressed within lineages, or even families, and to keep a local character10.

8

Ibid p. 57-63
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On the contrary, a state land regime in an area of high immigration will tend to cause an
ethnicization of the conflict which will be expressed on the national scene: the cases of Côte
d'Ivoire (p. 129-139), Kenya (p 139 -157) or Rwanda (p. 229-252) are thus considerably
informed. The author rightly notes that areas of low immigration, where a state land tenure
system is in force, are rarer: it is most often in the context of migrations supervised by the state
that the latter assigns land rights to migrants, generally integrating their political support into
clientelist networks. Boone hits the main core of the Ivorian conflict: immigration supervised by
the state (is it important to note that most partisans of RDR now RHDP are either immigrants or
sons and daughters of immigrants). The clientelist network setup by political elites has allowed
for more support for their political parties.
Scholars have argued differently on the main causes of ethnic in Côte d'Ivoire. While some argue
that ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire can be explained based on inherited political boundaries,
others argue that Côte d'Ivoire’s ethnic turmoil is the result of land dispute and land tenure.
Understanding the complexity of the conflict in a country could lead us in considering multiple
factors. Random boundaries coupled with a colonial style of governance are believed to be the
main argument for ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire according to two of the authors. Others argue
that Côte d'Ivoire's ethnic conflict is based on a land dispute which could not be resolved at the
local level thus needed government intervention to resolve the issue. Since government leaders
are more interested in keeping power, the elites will use this opportunity to favor their political
lines over others in a multi-ethnic community in the example of Houphouët-Boigny himself
during the Baoulé- Guéré conflict and recently in Duékoué as explained by Tra-Bi. Considering
all the arguments above, is it possible to say that these arguments are not enough to explain the
complexity of the Ivoirian ethnic conflict?
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Analysis
Precolonial Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire consists of different ethnic groups within its Muslim and Christian
population. Even though the country has more than 60 ethnic groups, they have over time,
consolidated into five major ethnic groups. The Akan (East and Center, including Lagoon
peoples of the Southeast), Krou (Southwest), Southern Mandé (West), Northern Mandé
(Northwest), Sénoufo/Lobi (North-Center and Northeast) but can be identified predominately
within the Islamic or Christian religion. The north consists of mainly the Muslims and Christians
are in the southern areas of the country.11 Côte d’Ivoire before colonization was part of many
empires, from the Mande empire of Mali which spread south to the land of the Ghanaian empire
spreading West. In its early ages, Côte d’Ivoire was a trade route through which products and
religion passed. Bondoukou, a city in the Eastern part of the country under the Muslim Kong
Empire became a major center of commerce and Islam. The kingdom’s Quranic scholars
attracted students from all parts of West Africa. In the mid-eighteenth century in east-central
Côte d’Ivoire, other Akan groups fleeing the Asante established a Baoulé kingdom at Sakasso
and two Agni kingdoms, Indénié and Sanwi. The Baoulé, like the Asante, elaborated a highly
centralized political and administrative structure under three successive rulers, but it finally split
into smaller chiefdoms.12
The history of the territory of present-day Côte d'Ivoire, but also that of its neighbors
(Ghana, Guinea), is characterized by the settlement at various times of populations from
Robert John Mundt. Et al “Côte D'Ivoire.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 7
Mar. 2019, Accessed March 30, 2019, at: www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire/Languages#toc55125.
12
Comhaire, Jean L., Mundt, Robert John and Lawler, Nancy Ellen. "Côte d'Ivoire". Encyclopedia
Britannica, 11 Mar. 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire. Accessed 8 April 2021.
11
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neighboring regions, the oldest settlements being located on the coastal lagoon. When the
Ashanti began to structure themselves in the savannah area, it frequently happened, from the end
of the seventeenth century, that vanquished princes, dissatisfied with their fates, left the region
with their people to go and found a kingdom elsewhere and thus escape dynastic quarrels.
Among these migrants, the Agni founded Enchi (Ghana) and the coastal kingdom of Assinie.
In the eighteenth century, the Denkyira, defeated, founded the small kingdom of Ndemé and
Moronou. The Baoulés also left the space conquered by the Ashantis to found, at the beginning
of the 18th century, the villages of Béoumi and Beglessou in the middle valley of Bandama. The
second Baoulé settlement, coming from the Ashanti area in Côte d'Ivoire, dates from the
beginning of the 18th century. Around 1717, a quarrel between the Ashanti King Opoku Ware
and Queen Abla Pokou led the latter to cross the Comoé and settle in the vicinity of Bouaké with
a group that took the name of Baoulés. This kingdom only had an ephemeral existence: the niece
of Queen Pokou was able to maintain the unity of the group but, upon her death on the
battlefield, the Baoulés dispersed; the clans were the only trace of the Baoulé social organization
which survived when they mingled with the Sénoufo or the Malinké. Some of these migrants
headed north and then east and founded the new kingdom of Tyokosi (Togo).13
In the region, only the Akan was created in the East and the Center of the durably
structured kingdoms. The Dioula Empire of Kong, in the north, had only a fleeting existence in
the first half of the 18th century. The city of Kong saw the Mande family of Tiéba Ouattara settle
there, who made their fortune in weaving and acquired weapons for their three sons. The eldest,
Sékou, leader of an army in the service of the king of Kong, Kéréou Sésouma, dethroned him

Ogunmola, Dele, and Isiaka Alani Badmus. “Le Chemin De L’autodestruction : Origine Et Dynamique De
La Guerre Civile En Côte D'Ivoire.” Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, vol. 30, no. 1/2, 2005, pp.
210–238. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24484609.
13
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and became king thanks to the support of his men who appreciated his integrity in the sharing of
the spoils. Sékou's youngest, Famaghan, went and found the kingdom of Bobo-Dioulasso around
1714, no doubt as an epilogue to a dynastic crisis. Relations between the two cities were often
strained: the Ouattara heirs fought for primacy as well as the territories they both wanted to
control. Famaghan even seized the insignia of Kong's power and his son Tiéba (1729-1742) still
refused to return them. The Ouattara kingdom of Bobo-Dioulasso secured control of vast regions
between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso until the beginning of the 19th century. Under Maghan
Oulé Ouattara (1749-1809), literate king and soldier, the kingdom reached its peak before
collapsing under the pressure of the dominated peoples from 1851. The kingdom no longer
existed during the French conquest because, in the meantime, he had been absorbed and
butchered by Samory Touré and his allies.14
The power of the kingdom of Kong was soon less linked to the war than to the control of
the trade routes in the South (gold, cola, weapons) and the North (slaves, cattle, salt, and horses),
with its commercial activities and its cultural influence. The Muslim merchants built vast
Sudanese-style terraced houses, surrounded themselves with scholars and marabouts and the five
mosques with their “madrassa” dominated the city protected by ramparts.
The dynamics of these kingdoms (religion, trade, politics, and education) are based on
ethnicity. The northern parts of the country composed of mostly Muslims were mostly traders
whereas the Christian south was more agricultural. The northern traders rarely mixed with
southerners. Northerner traders operated from the north of Côte d'Ivoire to neighboring countries
as Mali and Haute Volta (Burkina Faso). Although life existed, kingdoms prospered and trading
took place, there is little to no record of the factions mixing or even knowing of each other’s
14

CLOZEL, François-Joseph. DIX ANS A LA CATE D'IVOIRE. HACHETTE LIVRE BNF, 2016.
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existence before the 19th century under colonial rule. Since all countries in Sub-Saharan African
are made up of many ethnic groups with unique cultures, they are seen as major obstacles to the
formation of one unique national identity which has made Europeans assume that "Côte d'Ivoire
had no history, because, from the exterior, they became non-organized."15 This argument is put
forth by author C.M. Le Quesne who argues in “French West Africa” that the natural conditions
of the multiple forests in West Africa made it impossible for the people to meet and unite. The
author states that before the arrival of the French in the regions “the great forest belt consisted…
of a series of villages, each controlling an area around it of a radius”16. According to the author,
the divisions among the different ethnic groups had a geographical factor. Being separated by
forests and waters, the ethnic groups would stay in their places of origin rather than taking
dangerous perils to unknown territory. Also, according to Clozel’s explanation, the northern part
of Côte d'Ivoire seems to be the only to experience contact with people from other places with
the Kong kingdom interaction with the Ouattara kingdom of Bobo-Dioulasso and the attacks of
Samory originating from neighbor Guinea.

Meledje, Jean-Claude. “Côte D’Ivoire: From Pre-Colonisation to Colonial Legacy”. Social Evolution
& History. 2018. 16-33.
16
Le Quesne, Charles Martin. “French West Africa”. Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal
African Society. African Affairs , Apr., 1965, Vol. 64, No. 255 (Apr., 1965), pp. 78-90. JSTOR
https://www.jstor.org/stable/719817
15
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The French Colonial Conquest
The political developments in the region were brought to their knees by the invasion of
the French, who first maintained control over the coastal regions before extending their dominion
inward to all the present-day territory. Côte d’Ivoire became a French colony in 1893, however
strong resistance by Samori Touré, the Abbey and the Attié groups slowed the French occupation of
the interior. The French were able to fully conquer the country only after capturing Samori Toure and
following a massacre of the Abbey and Attié people.17 The French invasion took off when, "In
1886, to support its claims of effective occupation, France again assumed direct control of its
West African coastal trading posts and embarked on an accelerated program of exploration in the
interior." As a result, in 1889 Britain recognized French sovereignty in the area, and thus the
French were assured of their rights to exploit the land and people in relative peace.18 In Côte
d’Ivoire as in other African countries, the colonial state played a crucial role in the formation of
ethnic identities and the translation of this into the space – territorial and mental – of power.
Colonial ethnologists, including Maurice Delafosse who was one of the first to distinguish in this
territory the major linguistic families such as the Agni, Dioula, Sénoufo, etc., initiated a process
of classifying groups which would give shape to French stereotypes of ethnic groups in the
country, traces of which are still found today.19 However, this labeling (stereotype) of ethnic
groups is not due to Delafosse’s work alone.

Viti, Fabio. “Les Massacres De Diapé Et De Makoundié (Côte-D'Ivoire, Juin 1910) : Entre Répression
Coloniale Et Violences Interafricaines.” Cahiers D'Études Africaines, vol. 57, no. 225 (1), 2017, pp. 59–
88. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26613005.
18
Library of Congress Country Studies, Ivory Coast\
19
Dozon, Jean-Pierre. « L’invention de la Côte-d’Ivoire », Le Genre humain, vol. 20, no. 2, 1989, pp.
135-162.
17
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It is much more explained by the fact that ethnic identities and the “large families” are
immediately categories of the colonial practice, that they take on meaning within a system that
differentiates them and ranks them and claims to measure their aptitude for being colonized. This
is how the figure of the Dioula stands out of the ethnic hierarchy as an economic agent of
progress, custodian of a long-distance trade tradition, it represents an essential element for the
transition from a coastal economy to a trading economy affecting the entire colony. The Sénoufo
is also valued: deemed to be a good farmer and a good worker, he embodies the ideal figure of a
strong and docile workforce. To the “qualities” the people of the North (Dioula and Sénoufo)
oppose the variously supported judgments concerning the people of Southern Ivorian. The Agni
is given some consideration (a term designating here the population of south-eastern Côte
d’Ivoire divided into several kingdoms and not the big family which includes other groups) who
knows the importance of protocol and by an economy oriented towards exchange. They are, on
the other hand, the Baoulé (distinguished from the Agni, Attié, and Abbey while belonging to
the same large family which will later take the name of Akan group) who the French simply refer
to as having weak political organization. Of their side, the Krou identified as resolutely
“anarchic” occupy the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy; with however some nuances that alleviate
negative judgments; like those Bakoué reputed “more intelligent and more vigorous” than the
Bété who accumulate, for their part, disqualifications (primitive, deceitful, and lazy).20
This hierarchy reflected the representations that the colonist had of the local populations,
but also and above all the alliances that he had to forge to ensure the development of the colony.
When it was founded in 1893, the French mainly occupied the Basse-Côte (the coast of the
south-east of the country). Their focus then turned towards the forest zone of the West for the

20

Ibid
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exploitation of wood, palm oil, ivory, and then, from the end of the 19th century, coffee, and
cocoa, but which had the disadvantage of being occupied by populations considered “primitive”
and resistant to capitalist penetration. To resolve this dilemma, the colonial administration
appealed to the people of the North, notably the Dioula, renowned for their trading traditions,
who, during the first half of the 20th century, migrated in large numbers to the South. At the very
moment when Côte d’Ivoire was being constituted as a geopolitical entity, the region which was
supposed to become the main pole of colonial development, the South, was the object of both a
disqualification of the natives and a valuation of the allogeneic21, a systemic problem with
consequences for decades to come.
The conquest of Côte d'Ivoire was all but peaceful various groups in Côte d'Ivoire
opposed colonial insurrection in the country and the last opposition ended in 1920-1921 with the
defeat of the Lobi people in the North-East of the country. However, the commonly known, most
elaborated, and well documented is the opposition of the Attié and Abbey group between
January and March 1910.22 Among the “recalcitrant” populations of the southern and forested
part of the country, we must also count the Abbey, protagonists of one of the best-organized
revolts, which broke out in January 1910. For three months, the Abbey, who had intentionally
involved in their movement the Attié neighbors, had held in check the colonial troops, until the
surrender in April. During the attack, the “rebels” had attacked the railway in several places,
killing the passengers in a convoy. During the following weeks, the insurgents had not only
damaged the railroad tracks over several tens of kilometers, but they also attacked the Dioula
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hawkers, and the railroads' workers causing many casualties. The results of the revolt, drawn up
by the colonial authorities, stated that for the Abbey and Attié combined, 574 rebels killed and
60 wounded “Observed”, which suggests a higher number of victims. By contrast, the colonial
troops had suffered many fewer losses with 21 natives killed, including 13 skirmishers, 5
Europeans wounded, including 4 officers, and 66 wounded skirmishers.23
The revolt, which had targeted the railroad, resulted in a significant number of victims,
the destruction of many villages and cultures, disarmament, the imposition of a fine of war, the
capture, and deportation of chiefs and “ringleaders”. The repression that followed became one of
the bloodiest in Côte d’Ivoire’s history. In June 1910, “reconnaissance” was therefore in
progress, intending to establish the conditions of the final submission. It was then that two
episodes similar and concomitant, happened a few kilometers away from each other, disturbing a
phase of relative calm. Mainly affecting two villages, one Attié (Diapé), the other Abbey
(Makoundié), the harsh repression that fell upon unarmed populations, including the elderly,
women, and children, revealed a strong spirit of revenge on the part of the colonial troops and
the culpable inertia of the authorities. These massacres were, in fact, in the context of the
“pacification” of the colony, continued from 1908 to 1915 under the direction of Lieutenant
Governor Gabriel Angoulvant. This one, slayer of the “peaceful conquest” of his predecessor
Clozel and supporter of the “manière forte”24, was taken aback by the largely autonomous
initiative of the military, which led him to open a very hard dispute against them, in which these

Doffou Yapi Clément. De La révolte Des Abbey à L'assassinat D'ernest Boka, Un Devoir De vérité!
Éditions Biessodji, 2017.
24
Angoulvant, Gabriel. La Pacification De La Côte D'Ivoire : 1908-1915, Méthodes Et Résultats.
Bibliothèque Nationale De France, 1916.
23

20

massacres played a secondary role.25 After this episode, Captain Foulon who oversaw the
“reconnaissance” was replaced by the more severe Lieutenant Alessandri.
While in charge of the military and police force, Alessandri started a bloody campaign of
repression, killing men, women, and children, burning villages, and stealing livestock. In total,
according to the villagers, more than a thousand persons were killed in the process based upon an
assumption that the Attié people may have sheltered the rebellious Abbey, a number disputed by
French authorities. Meanwhile, another massacre took place, this time in the Abbey village of
Makoundié where “primitives” (expression by Angoulvant in justifying the killings in the
villages) could not be taught how to behave when going in reconnaissance. By this, Angoulvant
means that individual excesses can still be committed because, according to him, it is impossible
to ask “primitives” to behave like “wise men”.26 Therefore, the massacres happened with no
consequence for the perpetrators.
Once the territory was under control, French administrators in 1932 moved on to
amalgamate two territories together (Côte d'Ivoire and Upper Volta) to make one Côte d'Ivoire
by building rail and road networks to connect the two parts.27 However, in 1947, a decree
abrogated the former decision and part of Upper Volta was shared among present-day Mali,
Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire28 for the French to put in place the creation of the Federation of French
West Africa. The effect of this transfer created a huge movement of people from one colonial
territory to another for social and economic reasons and the ambiguity of the borders created,
according to Abdoulaye Bathily, “frequent and unnecessary conflict between the governors of
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different territories over the exact boundaries between them”.29 The confusion in the outlining of
these frontiers saw various ethnic groups of nowadays Mali, Burkina Faso, and northern Côte
d'Ivoire overlapping in the post-colonial states. An example of a kingdom sharing lands in all
three post-independence states in the Kong empire stretches from northern Côte d'Ivoire to parts
of Mali and Burkina Faso.30 With common names with people from Mali, Burkina, and Guinea,
ethnic groups in northern Côte d'Ivoire experienced discrimination well before independence.
The ethnic division and classification which described Malinké and Sénoufo as superior played
out against those very same people who during colonial times helped the colonizers in their quest
to secure the territory.31 Upon the departure of the colonial powers, national leaders did not take
into account the damage done by the colonizers. Nothing was done to resolve the issue of the
arbitrarily drawn borders and, to make matters worst, those same leaders who complained about
the borders ratified those same geographic mosaics under the Organization of African Unity
(OAU).32
The conclusion to draw based on the history of Côte d'Ivoire is that a country made of
people coming from different places are refusing to coexist. With some ethnic groups such as the
Bété and the Baoulés considering themselves as “real” Ivorians, those from the north or having
Muslim names are considered being from Mali or Burkina Faso. The understanding is that such
names, according to some elites, raise doubts on the “genuineness” of their citizenship just
because based on the assumptions of the elites that workers and laborers from those countries
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(Mali and Burkina Faso) bear the same names as the northern ethnic groups of Côte d'Ivoire.
This argument was presented by northerners as the reason why they are considered and treated as
a second-class citizen of the country, thus the creation of a divide among people of the same
country. This divide will come to be the main cause of the 1999 coup plugging the country into
chaos for years to come.33
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French Colonial Rule and The Transition to Independence
French rule over Côte d'Ivoire incorporated two important parts: assimilation, and
association. However, at different points, administrators used a mix of direct and indirect rule
using indigenous leaders to manage villages under the banner of association. Assimilation meant
the superiority of French culture over all others, meaning that the colonies will adopt all French
cultures including the language, the institutions, the laws, and the customs. In other words,
"civilization" for the peoples of French Africa involved the imposition of French values on
African culture. This implicit and unchallenged acceptance of the French language, dress, food,
education, manners, and lifestyles set France apart from its colonial peers. Instead of an indirect
approach, France has treated African political institutions and culture as if they were irrelevant.
However, a great dilemma was faced with the implementation of the assimilation policy.
Theoretically, assimilation exposed potential equality for people of all races. This implied
political, economic, and social equality between the French and the inhabitants of their overseas
colonies, including Africans. But the consequences of this understanding and the French attempt
to evade it aroused the indignation of the colonized peoples while provoking a national debate
among politicians, academics, and colonial officials in France.
The policy of association also meant the superiority of the French. However, association
on its own carries different sets of rules, institutions, and systems of laws for the colonizers and
the colonized. Under the policy of association, the people in the colonies were allowed to keep
and practice their own cultures as long as they didn't interfere with French cultures and
customs.34 It is important to note that although both systems of colonial rules were offered and
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imposed on the people, assimilation was practiced to form a small group of westernized
Africans, and in this case, Ivorians educated elites and granted them French citizenship so that
they could defend French policies in their own countries. As Handloff et al. write, “The French
colonial administration also adopted divide-and-rule policies, applying ideas of assimilation only
to the educated elite.”35 These elites such as Leopold Sédar Senghor, Senegal’s first president,
and Côte d’Ivoire’s founding leader, Felix Houphouët Boigny, among others, served as deputies
in the French national assembly ahead of independence in their respective countries. Although
Africans in the colonies did not necessarily enjoy similar rights and privileges to those of their
counterparts in the French homeland, the philosophical underpinning of assimilation was to
create a semblance of assimilation in the minds of the colonized people.
Under the banner of association, the French created auxiliary tools to consolidate power
in the hands of French officials. It was difficult for Africans to contribute to political decisions.
With the new policy, the French divided African societies into districts placed in the hands of
people who were, in fact, collaborators with the colonial system. Indigenous leaders who
understood their people's culture and customs but remained hostile to colonial control were
excluded from the system. In this way, the French systematically eliminated African customary
law and established advisory councils to provide knowledge of African laws and customs at all
levels of the administration. Determined to maintain the distinction between citizens and
subjects, the French legal code was reserved for whites and other assimilated Africans, while the
millions of non-assimilated Africans were subject to a so-called indigenous system. The
indigenous were created to implement African law in the administration of civil and criminal
justice, but it operated on the whims of French officials and their African collaborators. In
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addition, this policy allowed colonial officers to incarcerate their African subjects without trial.
The policy also mandated French African colonies to offer ten days of forced labor.36 Because
the population of Côte d'Ivoire was insufficient to meet the high labor demand, French
authorities recruited large numbers of people from Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to work in
French plantations and forests, and this source of labor was so important to the French that “in
1932 the AOF (Afrique-Occidentale Française) comprised of eight French colonial territories in
Africa, annexed a large part of upper Volta to Côte d'Ivoire and administered it as a single
colony.”37 One of the fundamental reasons for future ethnic conflicts.
Felix Houphouët-Boigny’s rise to influence and power was, firstly, due to his rich and
influential background. Born in October 1905, son of the wealthy chief of the canton of
Yamoussoukro, Houphouët-Boigny attended the French school of medicine in Dakar where he
graduated and came back to Côte d’Ivoire to work as a rural doctor and, as required by his family
lineage, Houphouët-Boigny also pursued a career as a planter.38 He began his political career as a
co-founder of the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA or African Agricultural Syndicate) in 1944,
formed by disgruntled African planters dissatisfied with their working conditions and to protect
their interests against European settlers. With its anti-colonialist and anti-racist agenda, the SAA
with Houphouët-Boigny as the leader demanded better wages, better working conditions, and the
abolition of forced labor were disguised as civil service. As the head of the SAA, Houphouët
came to realize the problem faced by the French on the question of the labor shortage in the
country. Using his influence among planters, Houphouët contacted the people of the North,
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notably, the Sénoufo reputed for their hard work even by the French. Gbon Coulibaly, chief of
Canton of the Sénoufo who would become one of Houphouët's allies sent 1500 men to work for
wages in the south to compete with the growing number of French laborers.39
In the first Côte d’Ivoire elections of 1945, Houphouët with the support of his new ally
was elected a deputy to the French National Assembly and was easily reelected in 1946. That
year he also founded the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). This party
was affiliated with the French Communist Party and was an important component of the
interterritorial French West African Federation party, the African Democratic Rally (RDA), of
which he was also president. In April 1946, Houphouët received credit for enacting a bill that
abolished all forms of labor in “Overseas France” making him “a mythical hero who had
imposed his will upon the French.”40
In the late 1940s, the French administration became increasingly hostile to the PDCI,
especially after the Communist Party went into opposition in France, and in October 1950
Houphouët-Boigny decided to break his party's ties with the Communists to cooperate with the
French, all the time building up his party's strength and organization through successive
elections. In the period from 1956 to 1960, he divided his time between France, where he was a
member of the National Assembly and a cabinet minister, and Côte d’Ivoire, where he was
president of the territorial assembly and mayor of Abidjan as well as overall party leader.
Meanwhile, he strongly rejected the idea of a West African federation of independent states
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because he was unwilling to have the wealthy Côte d’Ivoire subsidizing its poorer neighbors.
When President Charles de Gaulle in 1958 offered French territories a referendum on whether to
join a new federal community or to become independent, Houphouët-Boigny campaigned
successfully for self-government within the French Community, a move that made him a traitor
in the eyes of Pan-African leaders such as Senghor, Sekou Toure, Nkrumah, and others.
Houphouët defended his position by arguing that “given the imperative of the century - the
interdependence of peoples - a unique experience of its kind is loyally attempted: that of a
Franco-African community, based on equality and fraternity,”41 a fraternity that others do not
share with the French.
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The Independence Years
Côte d’Ivoire attained independence from France in 1960 under the leadership of Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled the country for 33 years. During the first years of HouphouëtBoigny’s administration, Côte d’Ivoire experienced remarkable economic growth from the sale
of cocoa and coffee. During this time, Côte d’Ivoire had a GDP Per Capita greater than that of
China.42 Houphouët-Boigny combined economic policies with a clever policy that emphasized
dialogue and compromise among the various ethnic groups of Côte d'Ivoire. To mitigate policy
fears of domination by one ethnic group, he introduced an ethnic quota system within
government institutions, although most of the important posts were assigned to people who were
part of his Akan ethnic group (more so he moved the capital to his hometown Yamoussoukro). A
main consequence of the quota system was that it helped Côte d'Ivoire maintain a relatively
stable political and civilian profile compared to most African countries.43
Why would Houphouet-Boigny choose such a system of ethnic quotas? According to
Richard Crook, the president who was the key powerholder in the country controlling both the
government and civil service used his power to control recruitment to government institutions.
Therefore, the president “avoids appointing ethnic barons in the sense of those who might
represent a real or mobilized ethnic following.”44 This technique helped to create what the author
called a “rough balance” and insured ethnic dependency on the president and his cabinet while at
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the same time “used to balance ethnic, generational and even personal rivalries.”45 This means
that in the context of Côte d'Ivoire and its multi-ethnic settings, it is important to redistribute the
growth the country has experienced. It is also necessary to appoint people from different ethnic
groups in a position to oversee the president’s cabinet. It allowed government control over the
activities of such individuals. Houphouët’s main goal was to keep rivalry on a low level among
the ethnic groups and by joining the sole political party of the country (PDCI), which would help
reduce successionist conflicts. This is best described by Houphouët’s Baoulé culture as they
believe that “No one may know the identity [of a successor] while the chief is still alive"46, a
cultural decision that would prove detrimental to the country.
According to Ogwang, Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa and coffee plantation depended on immigrants
from neighboring countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana who were first brought into the
country as laborers by the French colonialists. To ensure the cheap labor from these neighboring
countries, Houphouët-Boigny engaged in policymaking to introduce liberal land ownership laws
favorable to immigrants, and by 1998, immigrants and their descendants accounted for 28
percent of Côte d'Ivoire’s population,47 and their ethnocultural settings are very similar to that of
the northern ethnic groups.
Houphouët-Boigny was very aware of the social divide taking place in the country and to
alleviate fears of political domination by one ethnic group, he opted for dialogue, compromise,
rewards, and incentives to keep the ethnic groups in peace and harmony. Nonetheless, tensions
still existed in the country concerning resource allocation since most plantations and natural
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resources were in the south. "Le modèle Houphouëtiste" was working to some degree until the
decline in the commodities prices of coffee and cocoa in the 1970s, also causing a decline in
government revenues.48 The decline in government revenue meant that Houphouët-Boigny’s
patronage system could no longer sustain itself, and more importantly, economic problems
exacerbated tensions between indigenous Ivoirians and immigrants, on the one hand, and
migrants from the North and locals in the South, on the other.
In early 1990, Côte d’Ivoire adopted a multi-party system, and the first competitive
election took place in October 1990 between Houphouët-Boigny and Laurent Gbagbo;
Houphouët-Boigny won the election. The most important aspect of this election was the
introduction of ethnonationalism and xenophobia in the country's political sphere. The
opposition party, Ivorian Popular Front (Front Populaire Ivoirien) accused the HouphouëtBoigny’s party Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire) of
representing the interests of foreigners and ethnic groups from the North.49 Within the singleparty system of Houphouët-Boigny, foreigners, and especially Burkinabe, constituted a political
clientele for the ruling party, the PDCI.
Houphouët-Boigny continued his presidency until his death when Henri Konan Bedié, the
president of the National Assembly, was chosen as president in 1993 based on the constitution
and was reelected in 1995. Houphouët-Boigny and Bedié shared the same ethnic group, Akan.
However, in contrast to Houphouët-Boigny’s politics of the unification of all ethnic groups,
Bedié’s rule consisted of discrimination against the northerners to gain political support from the
southerners, the ethnic group he belonged to. From the 1990s, the crisis in the Ivorian state
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revealed the hidden conflict ethnic groups were experiencing. Since the colonial period, state
policy encouraged migrants to colonize the land in forest areas. This policy, although it has
sometimes benefited migrants from neighboring countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, also
facilitated access to land for national migrants, especially the Baoulés. By the time Bedié gained
power, migrants from Burkina Faso, Guinee, and Mali have occupied most of the northern and
western farmable land, based on Houphouët-Boigny's ideals.
When Henri Konan Bedié reached power in 1993, it appeared so apt for Bedié to pursue
the political line of Houphouët that many Ivorians considered him to be the latter's natural son.
While the deceased president had never wanted to publicly name his political heir, the new
president found himself confronted with the personal rivalry, Prime Minister Alassane Dramane
Ouattara (ADO); the latter had led a presidential-type regime for several months, a northern
Muslim, belonging to a local Mandingo (Northern Mande) group called Dioula.50 This rivalry,
which was originally personal, significantly altered, albeit as discreetly as possible at first, the
regional alliances which guaranteed the country’s political balance. Bédié found himself
confronted with the persistence of the danger that ADO still posed as a presidential candidate,
with the same economic background as him, but with more and more supporters. He then
approached an opposition whose main foci were, as before, in Bété country, in the West.
It is from this forest fortress that he had taunted, one last time, in October 1990, the allpowerful and seigneurial Houphouët-Boigny, by presenting and supporting against him a direct
rival during the final renewal of his mandate. It was the same with the first presidential election
ever organized within the framework of the multiparty system. The leader of a new formation
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attached to the International Socialist Movement, the FPI (Front Populaire Ivorien), a Bété
history teacher from around Gagnoa, persecuted for a long time for his political opinions,
Laurent Gbagbo, obtained more than 18% of the votes in 1990 expressed against HouphouëtBoigny, a remarkable score under the circumstances.51
Henri Konan Bédié, once president and perhaps even before, found ways of dialogue, initially
secret, with this new star in the Ivorian political firmament. Along with this tactical attitude, the
second Ivorian head of state was concerned with modifying, with more apparent than real respect
for continuity, the major national and sub-regional options inherited from his predecessor. He did
so by encouraging the development of a reflection around Ivorian identity, by a group of
intellectuals openly claiming to be close to him under the name of "Curdiphe" (University cell
for research and dissemination of political ideas and actions of the president Henri Konan
Bédié). It was this circle that gradually spread the concept of "Ivoirité", the scope of which
proved to be more and more deleterious over time.52
The 1994 revision of the electoral code proved to be a result of Curdiphe’s ideals. The
revision was adopted in preparation for the presidential and legislative elections, scheduled to
take place in October and November 1995, respectively. It contained clauses imposing
restrictions on eligibility for public office, that presidential candidates should have Ivorian
parents and must have been continually resident in Côte d'Ivoire for the five years before seeking
election. Both requirements were widely interpreted as being directly aimed at preventing
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Ouattara, whose father was reportedly Burkinabe, from contesting the presidency.53 This idea of
Ivoirité by 1998 reached the local level regarding land tenure. Law No. 98-750 of 23 December
1998 regarding access to Rural Land is a perfect example of the concept of Ivoirité embodied in
the legislation. Its article 1 reads as follows:
The rural land tenure is composed of all lands, cultivated or not. It is a national
patrimony to which each person, physical or moral, can have access. However, only
the state, local public authorities and Ivorian physical persons can be owners.54
An important change came about with the creation of a new political party in 1994, the Rally
of the Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains) led by Georges Djéni Kobina, a dissident
of the ruling party. The creation of this party reflected a further split among the country’s elites.
The RDR sought to draw its support from the northern part of the country.55 The RDR posed a
real threat to PDCI’s electoral support from the north and this threat became even more realistic
in 1999 when ADO was elected as the party’s president. As a response, and as Crook notes,
“Bedié’s initial strategy was familiar to any student of electoral politics: he stole the opposition’s
clothes, and adopted a policy of Ivorian nationalism, under the slogan of the promotion of
“Ivoirité” (Ivorianness)”56 Elected presidents are known to support the ethnic group they belong
to hence why backlash may occur when an opposing candidate is elected. With the knowledge of
African politics, it is not incomprehensible that African leaders hold on to their identity and use
it as a political tool to either pool in supporters or create a focus of the population they will
support.
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Economic stagnation, Bedié’s pursuit of identity politics, the growing consciousness of
the northern people, and the “baoulisation” of the political-administrative sector was extended to
other sensitive sectors such as the military, triggered a coup d’état in December 1999 by a group
of officers and Guéï Robert, a Yacouba (ethnic group associated to Southern Mandé) became
President of Côte d’Ivoire. As Kieffer argues, the “opposition parties’ discourse of exclusion and
Baoulé domination of the Ivorian state is likely to have had an important impact on the attitudes
of the young non-commissioned officers involved in the coup d’état.”57 By the time of the coup
d’état, underrepresentation of the North was at its peak.
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Post-Coup Politics and the Turn to Civil War
Just like his predecessor, Guéï also engages in the "Ivoirité" rhetoric to gain political
support and to disqualify Alassane Ouattara from the 2000 presidential election. The 2000
election ended in chaos and violence. Demonstrations from FPI supporters and the refusal by the
RDR to recognize the legality of the election led to violent street protests forcing Guéï to flee the
country. Gbagbo then became president of Côte d'Ivoire.
Laurent Gbagbo is a Bété, one of the ethnic groups of the Krou family, and with his antiOuattara and anti-RDR and, therefore, anti-northern rhetoric, Gbagbo decided to allocate most
government positions to his party, the FPI. Northerners were largely excluded from his
government. Indeed, the northern underrepresentation in his first government was considerably
worse than in any government of Bédié. This aggravated the feelings of political exclusion
among the RDR supporters.58 Like his predecessors, Bédié and Guéï, Gbagbo wanted to change
the ethnic composition of the military forces to favor his ethnic group. To achieve this, Gbagbo
planned to demobilize two contingents that predominantly consisted of soldiers who had been
recruited during the brief reign of Guéï.59 In response to the planned demobilization, these
soldiers supported a mutiny which quickly turned into a more organized rebellion, which was led
by officers that had gone into exile either because of the military purges during the Guéï regime
or because of their involvement in the failed coup d‘état in January 2001.60
The violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire started with simultaneous attacks against the military
installations in Abidjan, Bouaké, and Korhogo on 19 September 2002. By the end of September,
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the rebels firmly controlled the northern part of the country and were referring to themselves as
the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI). The main grievances put forward by
the insurgents related to the land ownership laws, the criteria of eligibility for presidential
elections, the question of identity cards, and the political domination of the north by the south.61
Although most of its forces had a northern background, the MPCI claimed to have no specific
ethnic, regional, or religious affiliation.
The review of the literature together with the analysis forces us to reconsider some of our
original thinking about the causes of ethnic conflicts. Although it is an important part of African
history, state formation in Africa alone cannot be a cause of ethnic conflict throughout most of
its regions. The arbitrary borders, however, did contribute to the separation of many families and
ethnic groups, some of those groups which used to be a majority group before colonialism came
to be minorities once the borders were drawn. Early conflicts well before colonialism such as the
rise or fall of many empires were caused by internal strife which can be described as ethnic
conflicts within the kingdoms. The example of the fall of the Mali empire by internal Soninke,
Tuareg, and Songhay62 for whom control of Tombouctou was very important followed by the
conquest of other parts of Mali by Sonni Ali Ber to form the Gao-Tombouctou empire.63
Therefore, ethnic conflicts existed in parts of Africa well before the arrival of the Europeans.
The African continent has been the theater to ethnic strife well before the first colonizers.
Ethnic groups fighting for the control of large territories and people have been the cause of the
rise and fall of empires within the continent. Therefore, associating colonialism and the
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arbitrarily drawn borders to the main or sole reasons for ethnic conflict in the continent is to
ignore the history of Africa. States formation and colonialism did contribute to the exacerbation
of conflict within an already broken community. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, research has
demonstrated that the causes of ethnic conflict in the country are multi-dimensional. It is the
result of multiple factors, such as immigration through the politics of the French government
style (later on supported by Houphouët-Boigny) during which labor force was exported from
Mali and Burkina Faso to sensitive areas where indigenous people will rise against immigration,
land ownership which created vast indignation within the indigenous community which saw their
land being redistributed to “immigrants” by the French and later Houphouët-Boigny under the
label “la Terre appartient a celui qui le met en valeur” which means the land belongs to whoever
enhances it. Finally, the politicization of otherwise non-political events is a current theme in Côte
d’Ivoire as everything that happens in the country takes a political turn.
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From Civil War to Uneasy Peace
The civil war as the result of ethnic conflict can be divided into two. The first civil war
from September 2002 to 2004 ended with the accord of Linas-Marcoussis where belligerents
signed a cease-fire in 2003.64 The second from March to April 2011 ended with the forceful
removal from office of defeated president Laurent Gbagbo by the French forces. Elections were
held under the Ouagadougou Agreement where parties to the conflict agreed to an open election;
an election that gave way to the victory of Alassane Ouattara, a victory on the other hand
contested by Laurent Gbagbo. It is important to note that many peace talks happened but failed
to provide any real outcome to the conflict; peace talks such as Accra, Lomé, Paris, and
Ouagadougou. We will talk about the Ouagadougou agreements since it was the only agreement
to provide a real outcome. After the removal from office of President Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire
experienced a relatively calm political tension. Nonetheless, partisans who believed in Gbagbo's
victory refused to participate in the peace process unless Gbagbo is restored to his "rightful"
place.
The Ouagadougou Agreement unlike the Accord of Linas-Marcoussis touched the base of
the Ivorian conflict that of grievances over citizenship rule. By addressing the grievance, the
Ouagadougou Agreement did not only pave the way to open elections but also grants “full
citizenship” to the then “disfranchised” northern Ivorians. The question of Ivoirité, which
according to author Abu Bakarr Bah “was introduced into politics as a nationalist-qua-ethnic
political stratagem disguised as patriotism… institutionalized through electoral reforms and
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national identification policies”65 will no longer pose a problem to northerners to run for office
and apply for governmental positions. Alassane Ouattara who since 1995 was unable to run for
the office of President will for the first time be on the ballot. Article 1 of the Ouagadougou
Agreement acknowledged "the identification of the Ivorian and foreign populations living in
Côte d'Ivoire is a major concern. The absence of a clear and standard identity document and
individual administrative documents attesting to the identity and nationality of persons is a
source of conflict.”66 So by recognizing this fact, Ivorian politicians have acknowledged a
profound understanding of the cause of war and what must be done to end it. This article alone
was able to resolve most of Côte d’Ivoire’s internal disputes. More articles were established to
resolve the issue of identification and the right to vote for Ivorian-born citizens who were never
registered in a registry office. Finally, the Ouagadougou Agreement addressed the problem of the
military coalition as to how to deal with the number of ex-rebels who after the conflict should be
integrated into the governmental armed force, a decision that will come to be a problem in a near
future.
After the 2011 conflict, relative peace was established in Côte d’Ivoire, the country from
2012 to 2017 experienced tremendous economic growth making it one of the fastest-growing
economies in the region,67 however, mutiny in November 2014 and January 2017 put a stop to
the progress. In November 2014, following the violation of the agreement with the government,
a group of armed former rebels now part of the national army took it to the street of Bouake
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(former capital of the Ivorian rebellion) to claim their “arrears from 2009 to 2011, faster
promotions, improved subsistence allowances, housing, and retroactive payments” that allowed
the soldiers to be on the same pay as other international forces in the country.68 While many
foreign investors view the uprising as a relatively minor setback, analysts and diplomats see it as
a warning of new problems to come, not least because it was the second mutiny in three years
and has unleashed similar uprisings by the security forces left out of the agreement. This matter
has come to show how little control Ouattara had over his old allies since similar mutinies took
place in January and May 2017 discrediting the efforts made by the government in resolving
mutinies in the country. The soldiers took the street in as many as six cities to ask for bonuses
that were not paid by the government, and the soldiers also claimed their rights and complained
about the way they are treated by the government and the people they fought for.69 The mutiny
raised fears of a resurgence of conflict, many people fled the city of Bouake which at the time
was completely under the control of the new armed force. The mutiny was finally settled when
Ouattara agreed to pay the 8,400 soldiers the sum of $16,000 each for their participation in the
2010-2011 post-electoral conflict.
The 2015 Presidential election helped to consolidate the peace process. The election also
legitimated Ouattara’s position as President of Côte d’Ivoire after the chaotic 2010-2011 election
and its conflicts. With the support of Henri Konan Bedié (at the time on good terms with
Ouattara), the election was just a democratic formality as Ouattara’s victory was expected since
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the opposition party the FPI has its leader Laurent Gbagbo at the Hague for charges of crime
against humanity.70 The election turnout showed that the divide between Ivorians since the
rebellion and well before then remains. Since Gbagbo left the stage, voter turnout came to be
very low (44.84% in 2015 compared to 84.09% in 2010).71 Since the introduction of the
multiparty system in Côte d’Ivoire, the 2015 election was the first peaceful election in the
country. An explanation for the year's peaceful elections could be a lack of motivation to
organize violence on the opposition camp. The main opposition party Front Populaire Ivoirien
(FPI) found itself out of power since the arrest of its president Laurent Gbagbo. Many of its
former executives are in prison or under house arrest, and others are still in exile. Many former
associates of Gbagbo have been dismissed from their posts in the public administration. They
had little more to lose from the 2015 presidential election and, therefore, no reason to forcibly
prevent the election from taking place. Instead, the moderate faction of FPI led by Affi
N'Guessan peacefully contested the presidential election, as it seemed their only chance to ensure
the party's survival. The hardline FPI faction led by Aboudramane Sangaré firmly clung to the
boycott of the elections. The tough opposition's ability to derail the vote, however, was arguably
weak.
Another explanation for the overall peaceful nature of the election could be international
attention and the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping mission known by its acronym
ONUCI. The mediation of ONUCI and other UN, international and bilateral agencies may have
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succeeded in involving at least part of the opposition in the electoral process. For example, in
2014, the UN negotiated a compromise regarding the composition of the Election Commission.
This power-sharing compromise, one of the main causes of conflict in the country, allowed
moderate FPI politicians to participate in the preparations for the elections. In addition, ONUCI's
intransigent stance on many election-related issues may have convinced opposition members that
violence will not be rewarded. Finally, their discreet presence throughout the country may have
deterred the violent actions of the hard opposition. Can we assume that this 2015 brought some
relative peace in Côte d’Ivoire? The short answer is no, because many old and some new
grievances prevent nation-building, a prerequisite for peaceful electoral democracy. FPI hardliner supporters believe that Alassane Ouattara was illegitimately brought to power in 2010 with
the help of France and ONUCI and violated the constitution by running in the 2015 elections. In
addition, Ouattara is considered the president of the peoples of the North and of immigrants,
especially those of Burkina Faso, accused of illegally exploiting the wealth of Côte d'Ivoire.
Opposition members have been arrested and faced criminal charges while forces loyal to
Ouattara have so far suffered no consequences for their war crimes. Public functions are mostly
filled with friends of the government (this has happened with all previous presidents), and
mutiny is still happening in the country for different reasons. Reconciliation between the
different ethnic constituencies of the major parties is stagnating, and still yes, this appeased
election can be a first step to consolidate the ballots as a better alternative to bullets. The
peaceful presidential election may have convinced more Ivorian citizens, especially the new
generation, of the value of electoral democracy; a value called into question by the experience of
electoral violence.
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It came to be a surprise when Ouattara decided to run for a third term after modifying the
constitution, and by doing so, destroyed all the peace efforts made throughout the last decade.
After Ouattara announced his bid for a third term, fear of violence led people to flee the country.
According to the United Nations refugee agency, “3,200 people had fled Ivory Coast to
neighboring Liberia, Ghana and Togo because of electoral tensions.”72 Ouattara’s announcement
has awakened the old demon of Côte d’Ivoire’s politics. Leaders from the opposition parties
especially those of PDCI and FPI made a joint statement encouraging the boycott of the election
and civil disobedience which led to more than forty people getting killed. Even if the opposition
says it wants to "restore the rule of law and democracy", according to Henri Konan Bédié, the
call for "civil disobedience" leads to a further escalation of tension in Côte d'Ivoire. About 15
people died in violence following the announcement of President Ouattara's candidacy for a third
term. Scuffles took place in several localities after the announcement of the Constitutional
Council of the list of candidates selected for the ballot. Fears escalated when Soro Guillaume,
former Ouattara ally and ex-rebel chief in an interview argued that the election of 2020 would
not happen and called upon soldiers, non-commissioned officers, senior officers, and general
officers to take arms and raise against Ouattara.73 This threat was perceived as an imminent coup
d’état that was to happen in the coming days.
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The continued strong economic growth of Côte d'Ivoire led to some improvements in
social and economic rights. However, the government failed to address the root causes of past
political violence, including entrenched impunity, a politicized justice system, and long-standing
political and ethnic tensions. The return of Laurent Gbagbo from the Hague where he was
acquitted of crimes against humanity and his non-imprisonment upon return to Côte d'Ivoire are
seen as a prospect for peace building.
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Conclusion
Ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is similar to what Hizkias Assefa describes in his book
"Ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa". The author supported the argument that most ethnic
conflict (at least in the Horn of Africa) is caused by élite groups. Power was given to HouphouëtBoigny by French colonizers at the time of independence without any type of consensus among
the population. Houphouët-Boigny also appointed his nephew (Bedié) first as the minister of
finance before giving him the seat of the president of the National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire
which at the time meant he was also considered the vice-president; both Houphouët-Boigny and
Bedié belong to the same Akan ethnic group.
The political manipulation of disputes among ethnic groups had a significant part in
ethnic conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire. According to Assefa, ethnic conflicts are not and have not
resulted in conflict on a people to people or group to group conflicts unless manipulated and
organized by political leaders. Another cause of ethnic conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is the
inequalities in the distribution of power, Bedié, Guéï, and Gbagbo put in place discriminatory
policies and laws to keep one ethnic group from ascending to power, and government position.
Another dimension of Côte d'Ivoire’s ethnic conflict is the location of the ethnic group
throughout the country. It is interesting to point that people in general even before the conflict
used to live and community separated from one another.
The country of Côte d’Ivoire has experienced one crisis after another. This young
country is currently undergoing deep social issues. The psychological effect of the civil war still
lingers on everyone's mind, and the 2020 election has created more social issues than it solved.
The return of Laurent Gbagbo in the political sphere has split the population even further. Part of
the population considers the return of Laurent Gbagbo as justice well done for a wrongly accused
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man, while the other half considers his return as justice not done for the victims of the postelection crisis of 2011.
The political balance sheet is difficult to establish, unfortunately, with the instability that
we observe before our eyes. Alassane Ouattara's bet at the end of the war was to make peace
through growth and this has been relatively successful. In any case, in terms of macroeconomic
figures, growth has returned to Côte d'Ivoire. The achievements, especially in terms of
infrastructure, are impressive and investors have returned. The country has, in a way, been put
back on track from what it was then. Except that this growth has remained in a way extremely
unequal, has even produced new and very strong frustrations in the country. The emergence, as it
is called, has also produced "nervousness", as they say in the working-class neighborhoods of
Abidjan, where money is practically missing. The economic situation produced a lot of
frustrations, but especially politically, what happened was that in fact it was an unrequited
victory, which continued in a form of hegemonic quest. Power which has often be used as a tool
of political domination and systematically sidelined its rivals. So, it is still a winner’s peace as
very little has been done in terms of national reconciliation. A commission had been set up, but it
produced very little results. Côte d'Ivoire has a long way to go in order to finally reach national
reconciliation and we must find a solution so that the population of Côte d'Ivoire could move
away from the idea of vengeance and find true peace. Just like in South Africa, political élites
must be willing to allow a forum of discussion and hear grievances of potential victims of the
ethnocultural conflicts. In a country where speaking is a problem, the intervention of the U.N. to
set up such response mechanism to help in ending ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is necessary. In
such conflict, it is difficult if not impossible to find anyone guilty since these types of conflicts
are collective.
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